The states of Eastern Europe are going through a process of geopolitical readjustment determined by the Russian military aggression against Ukraine and the geographical advancement of the European integration project.

The manifestation of Russian militaristic revisionism against Ukrainian territorial integrity in February 2022 added to the previous policy of supporting separatism, which Moscow used against Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR. In parallel, the "awakening" or geopolitical maturation of the EU fuelled the conversation about moving the borders of the expansion of the European integration project to the East, inside the post-Soviet space, perceived by Russia as its exclusive sphere of influence (IPN, 2023). In this context, the governments of Georgia, Moldova and Armenia, which have not changed since the beginning of the geopolitical crisis in February 2022, prefer very specific geopolitical narratives to relate to both their own citizens and external actors. The main foreign policy narratives that are used by policy makers in Tbilisi, Chisinau and Yerevan concern war, foreign interference and, last but not least, the process of European integration.

Three different (geo)political realities

In the case of the Georgian government headed by Irakli Kobahidze, foreign policy is transactional and therefore multi-vector. From this point of view, according to the Georgian side, European integration would not be endangered due to increased trade with Russia. The same style of foreign policy is characteristic of other neighbouring states, such as Turkey, Azerbaijan, Armenia (for now). Within and in the EU neighbourhood – Hungary and Serbia respectively – they act in a similar way to Georgia, without suffering financial consequences in relation to Brussels. However, like Turkey and Serbia, Georgia does not adhere to European sanctions against Russia, except those targeting the financial sector and the re-export of dual-use goods. If the behaviour of the Georgian authorities had been an isolated case in the region, then the government in Tbilisi would have had a more cautious policy towards pro-EU domestic non-state actors, on which the law on "foreign influence agencies" begins to apply from August 2024 (GeorgiaToday, August 2024).

The current Moldovan government, dominated by President Maia Sandu, has a unilateral and unwavering position towards the pro-EU agenda. Any relationship with Russia, if it clashes with the European sanctions regime, is out of the question and official relations are frozen. Even the "5+2" format on the solution of the Transnistria conflict is suspended with the increasing likelihood of even being cancelled to lay the groundwork for negotiations in which Russia is not a party. Rapprochement with the EU and distancing from Russia are the basis of the current foreign policy of the Chisinau government, reflected also in the country’s new defence strategy, which states that the “aggressive policy” of the Russian state, including hybrid warfare operations, represents the main threat to Moldovan national security (RadioFreeEurope, July 2024). Although the authorities in Chisinau flatly refuse to acknowledge it, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine fuelled Ukraine’s pro-EU accession diplomacy, which Moldova subsequently used (together with Georgia).

Somewhere in the middle lies Armenia, which decreases security dialogue with Russia (not in the economic dimension), and instead begins the process of “Europeanisation” of internal security policies. Since gaining independence in the 1990s, Yerevan has shared with the Russian side some internal security responsibilities, such as controlling people entering Armenia through the Armenian capital’s international airport (RadioFreeEurope, July 2024). Thus, at the end of July, when the EU announced the start of visa liberalisation dialogue with Armenia, the Russian border police ended their mandate, after 32 years of monitoring the flow of people from abroad (Tass, July 2024). Although these processes have not been mutually conditional, the full restoration of its sovereignty over Armenia’s border control function will also facilitate compliance with the criteria for a liberalised visa regime with the EU (Reuters, July 2024).

Three geopolitical narratives in Georgia, Moldova and Armenia

War, foreign interference and European integration dominate the communication of the governments of the three capitals. In the pre-election situation in Georgia and Moldova, these themes are used by decision-makers to mobile their own electorate. The parties in power in these countries – "Georgian Dream" and the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), respectively – use these narratives in an attempt to renew their political influence in parliament and in the office of the president, respectively. The situation is very different in Armenia, where Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's Civic Contract party has consolidated its hold on power following early elections in June 2021, despite protests over the defeat in the Karabakh war in 2020. Unlike the recent anti-government protests in Georgia, organised on the basis of pro-EU sentiments by civil society, youth and opposition forces (April-June 2024), the protests in Armenia against the demarcation of the border with Azerbaijan are categorised by the government as attempts at destabilisation by pro-Russian forces.

The war narrative frequently used by Georgian government leaders consists of making general accusations about the intention of the opposition and the non-existent "Global War Party" to drag Georgia into a military altercation against Russia, opening a "second front". This topic is used as a basis for arguing against pursuing a tough policy against Russia in solidarity with Ukraine. The war also figures in the discourse of the governing forces in Chisinau. They appeal to this narrative to explain the origin of the socio-economic crisis to which the population has been exposed, especially the most vulnerable categories (pensioners, rural population, etc). The opposition often criticises the PAS-Sandu government for excessively resorting to the issue of the war in Ukraine as a leitmotif to justify its failures in the act of governing, such as the galloping inflation of 2023, the flight of investors, the high rate of emigration, etc. The narrative of war also persists in Armenia, where representatives of the ruling party silence opposition protests with the need to demarcate the borders with Azerbaijan, even through concessions, in order to avoid a new war. Unlike the narrative of the war in Georgia and Moldova, which deals with Russian aggression in Ukraine, the same theme in the case of Armenia deals with the perception of threat by Azerbaijan.

External interference is treated differently in the government narratives of the three countries. There is talk in Moldova and Armenia that Russia is interested in using pro-Russian opposition politicians to destabilise the two countries from within. Both countries denounce disinformation as one of the main forms of Russian interference. In this regard, Moldova appeals to the support of its Western partners to confront, in an election year, the hybrid threats attributed to Russia. At the same time, in Georgia, the shadow government coordinator, oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, and supporters of the ruling party suggested that the West was financing the actors involved in the April-June 2024 protests against the law on “foreign influence agencies”. A similar discrepancy is also observed when it comes to European integration, which has a strictly positive connotation in the discourse of the governments in Chisinau and Yerevan. European integration is presented by them as a kind of lifeline against geopolitical risks of Russian origin. The situation is different in Georgia. European integration narratives are often accompanied by criticism from the Georgian government towards the EU, which is accused of using double standards in opening accession negotiations, favouring Moldova (Agenda.ge, July 2024). In this way, the Tbilisi government is trying to validate the idea that Brussels would treat Georgia “unfairly” (Civil.ge, May 2024).

The geopolitical narratives used by the governments of Georgia, Moldova and Armenia denote an increasing degree of influence of exogenous processes on the dynamics of domestic politics. As a result, responsibility for failures in the act of governing is diminished or even nullified. Thus, democratic processes are altered to the detriment of transparency, meritocracy and the rule of law under the pressure of narratives about a hypothetical war and the real "hand of Russia" (Moldova and Armenia) or the rather imaginary "hand of the West" (Georgia).

The predominance of war and external interference in the central political discourse of these countries creates a tense internal climate, fuelling suspicion and, respectively, possible (re)pression against critics of the government by the opposition. Although European integration has a positive charge that can serve to overcome emotions of strategic uncertainty in society, in some cases narratives related to the EU can become a new channel for manipulating public opinion in order to maintain power.

Until the war in Ukraine ends, the borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan are bilaterally recognised, and European integration is removed from the dichotomous geopolitical dilemma, current and future governments in these countries will be tempted to exploit these narratives to justify domestic and foreign policy priorities, even if they may contravene the real public interest.