Azerbaijan’s September 2023 offensive into Nagono-Karabakh only lasted two days, but the repercussions of the conflict have shifted the balance of power in the South Caucasus. Armenia and Azerbaijan have different military equipment, regional territory, and international relationships since the offensive began that will shape the future of the conflict. Some experts predict that more war could now follow.

Leonid Nersisyan, a defence and political analyst at the Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia, called Armenia’s reduced military means following the conflict “a painful loss,” that could have significant implications for a future conflict. 

“After the Nagorno-Karabakh armed forces were disbanded, all the equipment they had was handed either to Azerbaijani troops or to Russian peacekeepers.” He continued: “Equipment wise, that’s a big loss because there were several dozen tanks and artillery pieces and some air defence assets, too. The personnel in general are withdrawn to Armenia, except a few commanders who were arrested by Azerbaijanis and taken to Baku.”

In the short Azerbaijani offensive, Armenia lost hundreds of fighters, four tanks, numerous armoured fighting vehicles, 29 towed artillery, four command posts and stations, and more anti-aircraft guns and missiles, according to Oryx, a defence analysis site. For a small nation that relies on military equipment shipments that have been crucial for its defence, the loss of fighters and equipment is significant. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, had minimal equipment losses, losing one tank and one truck.

The Artsakh Defence Army used to function as a buffer between Azerbaijan and Armenia proper, which Nersisyan noted was important for Armenia’s defence. The army was disbanded following Azerbaijan’s takeover of Karabakh, a condition set by Azerbaijan for the war to end.

“There is no Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army, so that equipment withdrawn to Armenia would have even boosted up the capacity to defend Armenia’s proper territory.” Instead, the forces gave up their weapons to Russian peacekeepers, as the peace agreement outlined.

Not only did Azerbaijan’s military reduce the power and territory of Armenia, but it is also in a stronger position to attack Armenia again, according to Nersisyan. He noted, “They don't have any enemy in their rear anymore.” Now, Azerbaijan can build military bases and position equipment in Karabakh territory.

Changing partners

Azerbaijan and Armenia’s international partnerships could also shift Armenia’s ability to defend itself and the viability of a future Azerbaijani attack, to varying degrees. Nersisyan predicted that the roles of several foreign nations serving as arms exporters and consultants to Azerbaijan would not change, but Armenia’s international relations related to its own defence has already shifted more drastically. 

Nersisyan noted that Armenia had received the vast majority of its arms from Russia after several defence contracts were signed in the years before the 2023 conflict, but Russia was not adhering to its own agreement – due to its own military constraints in Ukraine. In November 2023, Pashinyan publicly accused Russia of keeping weapons that Armenia had already paid for, and said that relying on Russia as a defensive partner had been a mistake.

Azerbaijan, on the other hand, receives arms exports and consulting from Israel and Turkey, which is unlikely to change as a result of the September conflict and its aftermath. Israel sold Azerbaijan Barak-8 surface-to-air missile systems, which were tested just a month before Azerbaijan’s offensive into Karabakh. In early December, Azerbaijan purchased the Barak MX air defence system, which is capable of launching missiles 35, 70, and 150 kilometres. It was a continuation of Israeli arms sales of Barak weapons to Azerbaijan, which began in 2012 with a $1.6 billion contract that included the sale of Barak-8 missiles in 2016. 

Armenia is also preparing its military for more conflict. According to Nersisyan, Armenia is now looking to India as “the biggest Armenian partner in defence” in light of Russia’s absence. In November, it was reported that the Indian company Indian Munitions Limited would supply 150,000 grenade units to Armenia. India also plans to supply Armenia with 90 advanced towed artillery gun howitzers over the next three years as part of a $155.5 agreement, six of which were already sent.

Second is France, a newer partner, which has already begun its shipments of armoured vehicles and radar technology. Nersisyan also noted that the European Union could provide Armenia with non-lethal military aid. Josip Borrel, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, noted in November that the European Union must “be very much vigilant for any attempts of destabilisation of Armenia, internally and externally”. The European Union’s Council of Foreign Ministers agreed to consider supplying Armenia with military aid as a part of its military assistance programme. Although Armenia has previously been denied military assistance from the European Union, Azerbaijan’s attack has highlighted the necessity of better Armenian defence.

While both Azerbaijan and Armenia replenish and improve military armaments for future conflict, Nersisyan believes that conflict could realistically spike again, most likely on a small scale that would only last a few days. He believes Azerbaijan could start another conflict to push Armenia to make arms concessions, which would be unlikely to trigger as wide an international response as the September conflict.

Azerbaijan could also use its superior military positioning to push for control of the road connecting Azerbaijan to its exclave territory, wanting access without customs checks and with Russian troops guarding it. Lastly, Azerbaijan could restart their attacks to regain old Soviet Azerbaijani enclaves within Armenian territory.

More optimistically, Nersisyan says a large-scale attack similar in scale to Azerbaijan’s September 2023 offensive was possible but unlikely.